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This article focuses on one particular issue which has arisen in the course of the ongoing 
debate on the reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), namely that of the 
appointment of arbitrators. Taking as its starting point that there now exists tentative 
consensus that the present system for the appointment of arbitrators either causes or 
exacerbates certain problematic aspects of the current ISDS system, the article explores one 
option for reform: the creation of an independent panel for the scrutiny of arbitral 
appointments is proposed. Such a body is the most desirable way to introduce necessary 
scrutiny into the current appointments system, which will in turn help to address some of the 
criticisms levelled at ISDS more generally, while at same time not removing completely the 
initiative that parties currently have to put individuals forward as their candidates to become 
an arbitrator. 
 










The process for the appointment of arbitrators in ISDS is an issue which has arisen in the 
course of the ongoing multilateral debate on reform of the system. 1 Concerns have been 
expressed that the party-centric method of appointments is either causing or exacerbating 
problematic aspects of the current ISDS system, contributing to its ‘legitimacy crisis.’2 It is in 
this context that the present article makes the practical and normative case for one particular 
option for reform, namely the creation of an independent panel for the selection of investment 
arbitrators (IPSIA).  
 
Under the proposals advanced below, parties to an investment dispute would retain the 
initiative to propose individuals who they wish to act as ‘their’ arbitrator. Subsequently, this 
choice would be scrutinised by IPSIA which would present a recommendation on the 
individual’s suitability. The parties could then take this recommendation into account before 
appointments were made in the usual manner (whether that be jointly by the parties, or 
through an Appointing Authority or otherwise).3 While the recommendation of IPSIA would 
be non-binding, practice of the other advisory bodies strongly suggests that in practice such 
recommendations can nevertheless have significant practical impact, and could have 
beneficial effects in relation to repeat appointments, double-hatting and a lack of 
representativeness among arbitrators.  
 
                                                 
1 See the Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of its thirty-
seventh session (New York, 1-5 April 2019) 9 April 2019, A/CN.9/970 and earlier its thirty-sixth session 
(Vienna, 29 October – 2 November 2018) 9 November 2018, A/CN.9/964. Parts of this discussion are based on 
James Devaney, “Selecting Investment Arbitrators: Reconciling Party Autonomy and the International Rule of 
Law”, KFG Working Paper Series, No. 33. 
2 See, Jose E. Alvarez et al (eds), The Evolving International Investment Regime (OUP 2011), Claire Balchin et 
al (eds), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration (Kluwer 2010), Susan D. Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis 
in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’ 
Fordham Law Review, 73, (2005) 1521. 
3 Tomáš Dumbrovsky, Bilyana Petkova and Marijn Van Der Sluis, “Judicial appointments: The Article 255 




2 The Current Appointments Practice in ISDS and its Criticisms 
 
The rules which govern the appointment of arbitrators at present are based squarely on the 
principle of party autonomy.4 Mirroring the decentralized nature of international investment 
law more generally, there is no one common process for the appointment of arbitrators by 
parties. Rather, the exact process for the selection and appointment of arbitrators will depend 
on the treaty or contract provisions indicating the preferred or default fora.5 Nevertheless, in 
the vast majority of cases it is the parties themselves who select the majority of the arbitrators 
for the settlement of an investment dispute in which they are involved. 
  
Under both ICSID and UNCITRAL rules, parties typically each appoint one arbitrator to 
form a three-member tribunal. The co-arbitrators then (under the UNCITRAL rules) appoint 
the third arbitrator or (under the ICSID rules) the parties do so themselves by mutual 
agreement.6 Provided that the mandatory procedural requirements are met, the factors that 
parties take into account when considering which individual to appoint as ‘their’ arbitrator 
need not be set out in any transparent form, or in fact given at all.7  
 
Criticisms of the current system of ISDS relating to the impendence and impartiality of 
arbitrators are by now well-known, having been both acknowledged at the multilateral level8 
and the subject of significant scholarly attention.9 What is important to emphasise at this 
                                                 
4 ICSID Convention, Articles 36-40; ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rules 1-4; 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, Articles 7-
10; 2012 ICC Rules, Articles 11-13; 2012 PCA Arbitration Rules, Articles 8–13; AAA Commercial Arbitration 
Rules, Rules 11-16. 
5 Note by the Secretariat, “Arbitrators and decision makers: appointment mechanisms and related issues”, 30 
August 2018, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.152, para 5. 
6 Article 37(2)(b) ICSID Rules, Article 9(1) UNCITRAL Rules. 
7 Secretariat Note on Appointments, supra note 13, para 7. C.f. See Article 52(3) ICSID Convention, and 
Appointing Authorities, See the figures set out in Note by the Secretariat, ‘Submissions from International 
Intergovernmental Organizations and additional information: appointment of arbitrators’, 19 February 2018, 
8 Draft Report, 6 November 2018, Secretariat Note on Appointments, supra note 13, para 37. 
9 Report of Working Group III, 36th Session, supra note 1, para 66, on ‘perception’ c.f. Susan D. Franck, 





juncture is the extent to which the traditional party-driven approach to appointments in the 
context of ISDS contributes to, or exacerbates to some extent, these criticisms.  
 
Issues of independence and impartiality arise (at least partly) as a result of the practices of 
double-hatting10 and repeat appointments,11 facilitated by the current appointments practice 
which grants almost total discretion to the parties as to who to put forward as their arbitrator. 
Furthermore, and again facilitated by the current appointments process, a lack of diversity 
among decision makers is said to undermine ISDS.12 In the context of recent multilateral 
discussions under the auspices of UNCITRAL this lack of diversity, in terms of gender and 
geographical distribution13 (but also broader considerations such as age, ethnicity, language 
and legal background) was generally seen by States as being a weakness in the current system 
which prevents better understanding of the policy considerations of States, local laws and 
international law more generally.14 In particular, the record of female representation on 
arbitral tribunals has been described by one prominent commentator as ‘remarkably poor’ and 
is a factor in and of itself which justifies reform of the current appointment system.15  
                                                 
10 Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn and Runar Lie, “The Revolving Door in International Investment 
Arbitration”, Journal of International Economic Law (2017) 20, 301-331, have shown that 47% of cases involve 
at least one arbitrator acting in another case; see also; Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Martin Dietrich 
Brauch, “Is ‘Moonlighting’ a Problem? The Role of ICJ Judges in ISDS” IISD Commentary (2017). 
11 See PluriCourts Investment Treaty and Arbitration Database (PITAD), available at: https://pitad.org – data 
shows that each year only 11% of arbitral appointments are first time appointments, see also Sergio Puig, 
“Social Capital in the Arbitration Market”, European Journal of International Law (2014), 25(2), 387. 
12 Report of Working Group III, 36th Session, supra note 1, para 91 et seq. 
13 Studies have shown that 74% of arbitrators are from Western States, see Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn and 
Runar Lie, supra note 26, 301-332; see also UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2018: Investment and New 
Industrial Policies (UN 2018)”, Ksenia Polonskaya, “Diversity in the Investor-State Arbitration: 
Intersectionality Must Be Part of the Conversation” Melbourne Journal of International Law (2018) 9, 296, 
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Michele Potestà, “The Composition of a Multilateral Investment Court and of 
an Appeal Mechanism for Investment Awards” CIDS Supplemental Report (2017). 
14 Report of Working Group III, 36th Session, supra note 1, para 92; see also Secretariat Note on Appointments, 
supra note 13, para 20. 
15 Successive studies have shown that only somewhere between 3 and 10% of ICSID arbitrators are female: Gus 
Van Harten, “The (Lack of) Women Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2011), All Papers,  Paper 3, 
available at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/all_papers/34 found 3%; Susan D. Franck, “Empirically 
Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitration” North Carolina Law Review (2007), 86(1) 1 
found 3%, Lucy Greenwood and C. Mark Baker, “Is the Balance Getting Better? An Update on the Issue of 
Gender Diversity” Arbitration International (2015) 31(3), 413 found 5.63%, Sergio Puig, supra note 27, found 
7%; see also ISDS Academic Forum Working Group 7 Paper, “Empirical Perspectives on Investment 
Arbitration: What Do We Know? Does it Matter?”, Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn and Laura Létourneau-
Tremblay, 15 March 2019. See most recently: Taylor St. John, Daniel Behn, Malcolm Langford, and Runar Lie. 





The operation of the principle of party autonomy, coupled with parties’ preference for 
‘expertise and experience’ as they seek to maximise their chances of success in any dispute,16 
is a direct cause of concerns regarding independence, impartiality, and representativeness. 
That said, wresting any modicum of parties’ ability to choose is likely to meet fierce 
resistance. As such, in the following sections reform is proposed which attempts to strike a 
balance between allowing parties input in, and ownership of, 17 the appointments process 
while also addressing valid concerns regarding independence, impartiality and 
representativeness.18 
 
3 An Independent Panel for the Scrutiny of Investment Arbitrators (IPSIA) 
 
While the principle of party autonomy may be fit to govern appointments in the context of 
international commercial arbitration, it is inappropriate in the context of international 
investment law. 19 Investment arbitration involves subjecting matters of public law and public 
policy to international review by an arbitral tribunal.20 Not only that, should the arbitral 
tribunal find that the public policy enacted by a sovereign State contravened its international 
obligations, it may issue a binding award against that State, the principal remedy being 
monetary compensation which is, in the simplest of terms, public money.21  
 
                                                 
16 Or what St. John, Behn, Langford and Lie, ibid, term the ‘prior experience norm’; see also Report of Working 
Group III, 36th Session, supra note 1, para 93. 
17 Report of Working Group III, 36th Session, ibid, para 95. 
18 Report of Working Group III, 36th Session, ibid, para 98. 
19 Martin Loughlin, “Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law”, European 
Journal of International Law, (2006) 17(1), 121, 139–45; Gus Van Harten, “Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
Procedural Fairness, and the Rule of Law” in S. Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public 
Law, (OUP, 2010) at 15. 
20 Eric De Brabandere, Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law, (CUP 2014); Van Harten, ibid, 
at 5-7, 15. 
21 Van Harten, ibid, at 6, 7, 15; On the spending of public money in international investment and commercial 
arbitration see Gary B. Born ‘Confidentiality in an Age of Transparency: Challenges for Investment Arbitrators’ 




Accordingly, the private or commercial principle of party autonomy is not sufficient to 
govern the process of the appointment of arbitrators in international investment arbitration 
which, although not exclusively public,22 is at the very least a hybrid of public and private in 
nature.23 Consequently, in light of its hybrid nature, the international rule of law must also 
play a role in international investment arbitration, including in the appointment of 
arbitrators.24 
 
This is not the place for extensive consideration of the principle of the rule of law, its 
application at the international level in general, or its relevance for international investment 
arbitration. However, two issues can be taken for granted. First of all, the rule of law, 
although developed in the domestic legal context, applies to the international legal order.25 
While the rule of law may play a different role at the international level, 26 the remarkably 
broad acceptance of this principle (despite its so-called ‘conceptual emptiness’27) is not only 
important in and of itself, but rather also provides the justification for the inductive task of 
attempting to identify its conceptual content.28  
 
                                                 
22 Jose E. Alvarez, ‘Is Investor-State Arbitration “Public”?’ 7 Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2016), 
534-574, Anthea Roberts, ‘Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System’ 
107 American Journal of International Law (2013) 45. 
23 Alvarez, ‘Is Investor-State Arbitration “Public”?’, ibid, Zachary Douglas, ‘The Hybrid Foundations of 
Investment Treaty Arbitrations’ 74 British Yearbook of International Law (2003) 151, Stephan W. Schill, 
‘Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New 
Public Law Approach’ 52 Virginia Journal of International Law (2011) 57. 
24 Van Harten, supra note 36, at 4. Similarly, Robert McCorquodale, ‘Defining the International Rule of Law: 
Defying Gravity?’ International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2016) Vol. 65. 
25 Van Harten, supra note 36, at 4, for a fuller discussion see Devaney, supra note 1 at 9. 
26 Van Harten, supra note 36 at 14, Brian Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (2004) 133-
5. 
27 James Crawford, “International Law and the Rule of Law” (2003) Adelaide Law Review, 3, 11, Sir Arthur 
Watts, ‘The International Rule of Law’ (1993), German Yearbook of International Law, 15. 
28 See Declaration on Principles of International Law Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN GA Resolution 2625 (XXV) (1970) Declaration on the 
Rule of Law at the National and International Levels 2012, UN GA Resolution 67/1, (2012) A/Res/67/1. FN 46 
- Between 1998 and 2006 being mentioned in 69 different resolutions, see Jeremy Farrall, United Nations 
Sanctions and the Rule of Law (CUP 2007) 22., Velimir Živković, ‘International Rule of Law through 
International Investment Law – Strengths, Challenges and Opportunities’, KFG Working Paper Series, No. 16, 




Secondly, a central component of the rule of law, which applies at the international level, is 
judicial independence. From Dicey29 to Raz30 and Hayek31, most of those writing about the 
rule of law envisage some form of judicial independence to be part of the concept. At the 
international level, too, judicial independence is recognised in a wide range of contexts.32 
Obviously, the rule of law does not require one single court to settle disputes of all kinds, but 
rather ‘requires that a dispute can be settled before an independent body, which neither needs 
to be a court (so called) nor by one body with overarching jurisdiction over all matters.’33 In 
short, the act of judicial or arbitral decision-making carries with it ‘a very high expectation of 
procedural fairness’, including judicial independence.34 The standard of independence that 
the IPSIA should apply is an issue we will return to below at Section 3.4. 
 
With this in mind, it is argued that an appropriate balance can be found between the 
principles of party autonomy and the rule of law by amending the current rules in order to 
create IPSIA which, whilst leaving the initiative as to arbitral appointments with the parties 
(and as such preserving the principle of party autonomy) could also allow for other 
(international rule of law) considerations to be injected into the process. A number of 
constitutive elements must be considered, including (4.1) the creation and role given to the 
Panel, (4.2) appointment of members of the Panel, (4.3) the initiative to propose candidates, 
(4.4) the process for scrutinising candidates, (4.5) the transparent nature of its work and (4.6) 
the advisory nature of its work.  
 
                                                 
29 Albert Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885), Ch IV. 
30 Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” (1977) 93 LQR 195, 200-1. 
31 Friedrich Hayek “Freedom and the Rule of Law” in Listener (27 December 1956) 1067-8. 
32 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, Arts 21(3) and 23(1); 
Rules of the European Court of Human Rights, Rules 4, 24(2)(e), 26(1), 27; Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community, Art 223; Code of Conduct of the European Court of Justice, Art 5; Rules of Procedure of 
the European Court of Justice, Arts 6, 11(b), and 11(c); Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
OAS Res 448 (IX-0/79), Arts 5, 18, 25; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Arts 36(9)(a), 39(1), 
40(2) and (3). 
33 McCorquodale, supra note 42, at 298. 




3.1 The Creation and Role of IPSIA 
 
There is nothing ground-breaking about any suggestion that a body other than the parties 
themselves could play some sort of role in the selection of arbitrators. Advisory bodies which 
scrutinise judicial appointments exist both at the international and domestic levels.35 
Likewise, commentators in the past have advocated breaking parties’ stranglehold on the 
appointment of arbitrators. 36 For example, Sardinha has argued that the use of such a 
‘detached institution or authority in overseeing the appointment process…[could] help reduce 
the broader systemic perception or outward appearance of bias from the vantage point of the 
opposing party, of the co-arbitrators, and, particularly in highly contested investor-state 
disputes, of the public.’37 While the idea that a body other than the parties may play a role in 
the appointment of arbitrations is nothing novel, what is new is the proposal for the creation 
of an independent panel for the selection of investment arbitrators, in the form of IPSIA. 
 
The precise role of IPSIA would need to be made clear to parties from the very beginning, 
and its objectives and working methods transparently set out. IPSIA, which would be 
complementary to, and not a replacement for, existing processes for the challenge and 
disqualification of arbitrators,38 would be tasked with scrutinising candidates and facilitating 
that the highest-qualified individuals are appointed to investment arbitral tribunals. 
                                                 
35 See Ruth Mackenzie et al, Selecting International Judges: Principles, Process and Politics (OUP 2010), John 
Bell, Judiciaries Within Europe: A Comparative Review (CUP 2006). 
36 Jan Paulsson, “Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution” ICSID Review (2010) Vol 25, Issue 2, 340, 
347-8; see also; Albert Jan van den Berg, “Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment 
Arbitration” in Mahnoush Arsanjani and others (eds), Looking to the Future: Essays on International Law in 
Honor of W. Michael Reisman (Martinus Nijhoff 2011) 821, 834; Seth H Lieberman, “Something’s Rotten in 
the State of Party-Appointed Arbitration: Healing ADR’s Black Eye that is ‘Nonneutral Neutrals’” Cardozo 
Journal of Conflict Resolution (2004) 5, 215, 216. 
37 Elisa Sardinha, “Party-Appointed Arbitrators No More”, The Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals (2018) 17, 117, 133. 
38 Although, it is logical to imagine that weeding out potential issues at the appointment stage would reduce the 
number of challenges, see generally Article 57, 58, 14(1) ICSID Convention, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
Article 12(1)(2010); UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 12(2) (1994); LCIA 
Arbitration Rules, art. 10.1 (2014); SCC Arbitration Rules, art. 15(1) (2010), see generally Chiara Giorgetti, 





Undoubtedly, the introduction of such a body playing this role would depart from practice to 
date, however the creation of similar advisory bodies, such as the Article 255 Panel of the EU 
and Advisory Committee of the ICC, act as precedent for making such a break from long-
running practice. 
 
To elaborate, the decision to establish the Article 255 Panel was the culmination of a longer 
process towards recognising that some objective criteria should be applied when assessing the 
suitability of judicial candidates, as well as subjecting them to some sort of scrutiny by an 
independent body. 39 The significance of the institution of this practice cannot be understated, 
given the decades-long practice that preceded the Article 255 Panel whereby individual 
Member States essentially exercised their sovereign right to put forward whichever 
candidates they liked with minimal scrutiny (which led to a situation in which no candidate 
for the Court of Justice was ever rejected, as far as we know).40 The situation was broadly 
similar with regard to the establishment of the Advisory Panel in the context of the ECHR in 
2010.41 As such, it could be said that we can observe a similar normative shift from party 
autonomy to a greater emphasis on the rule of law component of judicial independence in 
these contexts. These examples also illustrate that the introduction of such mechanisms is far 
from being beyond the realms of possibility. Admittedly, these bodies serve to scrutinise 
appointments to permanent judicial bodies, rather than ad hoc appointments. Nevertheless, it 
is argued that the operation of these bodies can be adapted so as to operate in an efficacious 
manner in the context of individual arbitrator appointments in the manner illustrated below at 
Section 3.4. 
                                                 
39 Henri de Waele, “Not Quite the Bed that Procrustes Built” in Michal Bobek, Selecting Europe’s Judges 
(OUP, 2015), 25; established by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2005. The operating rules of the Panel were established 
through Council Decisions 2010/124 EU and 2010/125/EU. 
40 Jean-Marc Sauvé, “Le rôle du comité 255 dans le sélection du juge de l’Union”, in Allan Rosas, Egil Levits, 
and Yves Bot (eds), The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty 
Years of Case-law (Asser Press/Springer 2013) 102–3. 
41 Koen Lemmens, ‘(S)electing Judges for Strasbourg: A Disappointing Process?’ in in Michal Bobek, Selecting 





An independent panel for the scrutiny of investment arbitrators could be introduced in a 
number of ways, including: amendment of existing investment agreements, incorporation in 
new investment agreements, amendment of the various procedural rules such as the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules, and an opt-in Mauritius Convention type mechanism.42 It is suggested that 
the latter may be the most realistic mechanism for the introduction of IPSIA43 and that it 
could to a large extent replicate the best practice of existing advisory bodies such as the 255 
Panel and the Advisory Committee of the ICC. 
 
3.2 Appointment of Members of the Panel 
 
IPSIA could consist of members whose sole job would be to scrutinise and provide 
recommendations on parties’ proposed candidates. The exact number of members required 
could be based on projections of the workload of the Panel.44 IPSIA members would be 
drawn from the ranks of serving and retired judges and arbitrators with significant experience 
of both investment and public international law, and a willingness to set aside their ability to 
act as counsel or arbitrator in order to perform the supremely important function of helping to 
safeguard the legitimacy of the system as a whole. The obvious challenge in this regard 
would be finding suitable candidates who would be both available, as well as qualified (and 
sufficiently independent and impartial) to perform the role. In this regard, in the interests of 
avoiding recreating the same kinds of independence and impartiality issues in this context, 
                                                 
42 See Submission of the European Union and its Member States to UNCITRAL Working Group III, 18 January 
2019, “Establishing a standing mechanism for the settlement of international investment disputes”, paras 35, 36. 
43 Although of course one would hope for more enthusiastic uptake in the context of IPSIA given that the United 
Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (New York, 2014) has, as of 
2019, only attracted five parties, see 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency_Convention_status.html. For a 
related proposal see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Michele Potestà, ‘Can the Mauritius Convention Serve as a 
Model for the Reform of Investor-State Arbitration in Connection with the Introduction of a Permanent 
Investment Tribunal or an Appeal Mechanism?’ Geneva Centre for International Dispute Settlement (2016). 




not only must members declare any potential conflict of interest at the time of appointment, 
they should also undertake to avoid acting as an arbitrator for a period of between 18 months 
and three years following their appointment to IPSIA.  
 
Similarly challenging will be identifying exactly how members of the IPSIA could be 
appointed. In other contexts, such as with the Article 255 Panel or the Advisory Committee 
of the ICC, Member States can exercise the function of appointing such individuals through 
representative or executive bodies.45 In the absence of an obvious centralised body in the 
investment law context to perform this role, other alternatives would need to be explored. For 
instance, Members of the Panel could be appointed by the President of the International Court 
of Justice,46 in consultation with any other Appointing Authority or relevant non-State actor, 
in accordance with public and transparent criteria. 
 
It is absolutely essential that the IPSIA Members are appointed in a manner that ensures 
complete confidence in the panel. A lack of transparency in the appointment of members of 
both international47 and domestic advisory bodies has been cited as a consistent problem due 
to the fact that ‘eligibility rules for acceding to…judicial selection bodies are [often] notably 
vague’, and significant discretion is usually left to the executive in this regard.48 In this 
regard, it is suggested that lessons can be learned from the selection criteria for the selection 
of members of the ICC Advisory Committee which specifically require that the Committee 
reflect ‘the principal legal systems of the world and an equitable geographical representation, 
as well as a fair representation of both genders, based on the number of States Parties to the 
Rome Statute.’49 A similar formulation could be utilised with regard to the selection of 
                                                 
45 See Report of the Bureau on the establishment of an Advisory Committee on nominations of judges of the 
International Criminal Court, New York, 12-21 December 2011, ICC-ASP/10/36, Annex, C. 12. Annex, A.1. 
46 Submission of the EU, supra note 37, para 21. 
47 Lemmens, supra note 67. 
48 de Waele, supra note 65, 35. 




members of IPSIA, as it is essential that public, transparent criteria are publicised and 
adhered to in order to not simply transplant the current problems with the transparency of the 
appointments in ISDS to IPSIA. 
 
3.3 The Initiative to Propose Candidates 
 
In international legal scholarship a debate has played out over whether parties should 
continue to enjoy sole control over the appointment of arbitrators. For instance, as mentioned 
above, Jan Paulsson has been the most prominent voice in support of ending a purely party-
driven appointment process. Paulsson, who questions whether parties in fact enjoy a 
‘fundamental right’ to name their own arbitrator,50 contests the logic of the commonly held 
view that ‘my nominee will help me win the case’,51 arguing that this mentality is nonsensical 
due to the fact that, by this logic, the party’s nominee is cancelled out by the other party’s 
nominee and as such the parties can only have mutual confidence in one member of the 
tribunal, if at all. Consequently, Paulsson argues that the only ‘decent’ solution is that 
arbitrators should be appointed by a neutral body.52 Such arguments, of course, stand in 
apparent opposition to the preference expressed by parties to retain control over the 
appointments process.53  
 
Tufte-Kristensen has examined this preference, pointing out that sociological studies suggest 
that the notion of control over the process is the primary reason that the current system of 
appointment continues to be perceived as attractive by parties.54 Other high-profile 
                                                 
50 Paulsson, supra note 59, 348. 
51 Ibid at 349. 
52 Ibid at 351. 
53 School of International Arbitration at Queen Mary, University of London, “International Arbitration Survey: 
Current and Preferred Practices in the Arbitral Process”, (2012), 5. 





commentators have rejected any suggestion of reforming the current party-driven 
appointments system.55 Brower and Rosenberg, for example, have argued that the legitimacy 
and attractiveness of the current system of ISDS is inextricably linked with parties’ right 
(which has existed for ‘decades, even centuries’) to choose their own arbitrators.56 Some 
commentators contend that party-appointed arbitrators are essentially self-policing in terms of 
impartiality due to the fact that, in the open market of appointments, they rely on being seen 
as credible for future work.57 
 
Lawyers in the employ of parties typically expend significant energy scrutinising the records 
of candidates that they may put forward as their choice of arbitrator, including ‘the 
backgrounds of arbitrators, their relationship with the parties, published works and prior 
appointments before nominating them for arbitral appointments.’58 As such, the argument 
goes that the current system of party-appointment, whereby parties typically put forward 
‘someone with the maximum predisposition towards my client, but with the minimum 
appearance of bias’,59 is the best means for the appointment of arbitrators due to the fact that 
‘potential arbitrators effectively “stand for election” by parties every time a new case is 
brought.’60 
 
Given the strength of feeling on both sides of this debate that has been raging for more than a 
decade, it seems difficult to conclude that there is any sort of consensus as to whether the 
                                                 
55 For other supporters of party-appointed arbitrators see: Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law International 2014, 2nd Edition) 1807-808; Charles N Brower and Charles B Rosenberg, “The 
Death of the Two-Headed Nightingale” Arbitration International (2013) 29, 7, 25; VV Veeder, “The Historical 
Keystone to International Arbitration: The Party-Appointed Arbitrator - From Miami to Geneva” Proceedings of 
the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) (2013) 107 387, 401. 
56 Brower and Rosenberg, ibid, 8. 
57 Ibid, page 14, see also; Alexis Mourre, “Are unilateral appointments defensible? On Jan Paulsson’s Moral 
Hazard in International Arbitration” Kluwer Arbitration Blog (5 October 2010) 59. 
58 Michael Waibel, “Arbitrator Selection: Towards Greater State Control” in Andreas Kulick, Reassertion of 
Control over the Investment Treaty Regime (CUP 2016), 344. 
59 Martin Hunter, “Ethics of the International Arbitrator” Arbitration International (1987) 53, 219, 223. 




abolition of party-appointments would be wise, even if it were possible. Nevertheless, a 
procedure could be envisaged for IPSIA which represents a good compromise. In allowing 
parties to maintain the right of initiative in terms of selecting their candidate, they would still 
feel ownership of the process, as well as retaining one of the most popular aspects of the 
current ISDS system. Simultaneously, doing so in the knowledge that parties’ proposed 
candidates would be subjected to interview and scrutiny against transparent criteria, informed 
by the international rule of law, practice suggests that positive reform could nevertheless be 
introduced into the system. Aware that an independent panel of experts would examine issues 
such as track record, possible bias and past publications, issues of repeat appointments or 
independence could be weeded out before they arise. The configuration of the IPSIA in this 
way could ensure that the ‘benefits of the current system, such as its flexibility and neutrality’ 
that stakeholders have emphasised they would like to preserve,61 would be, whilst real, 
meaningful scrutiny of candidates in accordance with rule of law considerations is 
introduced. 
 
3.4 The Scrutiny of Candidates 
 
But how exactly would scrutiny of candidates work in practice? In simple terms, the role of 
IPSIA would necessarily change in the course of assessing individual candidates before it. In 
relation to the proposed appointment of certain individuals, say, any of the ‘power brokers’ 
included in the top 25 of Puig’s work,62 for a run-of-the-mill investment dispute (if such a 
thing exists), there would be little need to examine whether such a candidate had the relevant 
legal expertise or practical experience. Such individuals would easily be able to demonstrate 
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appropriate expertise and experience, and pressing the individual to substantiate their 
credentials in this regard would be a waste of IPSIA’s time.  
 
That said, for such individuals, who are regularly simultaneously involved in multiple 
disputes in one form or another, pertinent questions could perhaps be asked with regard to 
their impartiality or independence. Would it be appropriate for them to act as an arbitrator in 
that case given that in the past they have worked with the firm representing one of the 
parties? More mundanely, is it appropriate for them to take on their 61st investment 
arbitration? How do they expect to schedule a hearing for this dispute, given their myriad 
other commitments? And further, could they really be expected to engage fully with this 
particular case, or would it perhaps be necessary to rely on a research assistant to draft 
documents on behalf of that individual?63  
 
In different circumstances, however, the role that IPSIA could play would potentially be very 
different. For instance, there may genuinely be cases in which the legal expertise or 
experience of an individual may be open to question. This may particularly be the case more 
often if calls to diversify the current pool of individuals routinely called upon to act as 
arbitrators are actually heeded. In such situations, IPSIA members could probe the 
individual’s knowledge of substantive aspects of investment or public international law in the 
same way that substantive aspects of EU law are probed before the Article 255 Committee. 
An individual’s experience in managing cases, too, (an undervalued skill to have in 
international dispute settlement) could also be further explored.  
 
Any process of scrutiny of candidates put forward by parties would necessarily require the 
submission of supporting documents to IPSIA. By way of illustration, the Advisory 
                                                 





Committee of the ICC takes into account ‘written material submitted by the candidates in the 
form of statements of qualifications and curricula vitae.’64 A similar process can be easily 
envisioned for IPSIA, whereby it could consider parties’ justifications for putting forward the 
individual, the individual’s own motivations, their publications (academic or otherwise) and 
any other relevant information.65  In the case that IPSIA felt it lacked certain information, it 
could be endowed with the power to request information from the parties, although a binding 
power of subpoena finds no parallel in practice and is unlikely to find support. 66 
 
It would be essential that the criteria against which candidates are then assessed are made 
clear. In the context of the Article 255 Panel, whilst the formal operating rules do not 
explicitly lay out the criteria against which the Article 255 panel will assess candidates, and 
the provisions in the Treaties remain rather vague,67 the Panel itself has subsequently, 
through one of its Activity Reports made these criteria more explicit, stating that:  
 
‘[t]he panel’s assessment of these criteria is therefore made on the basis of six 
considerations: the candidate’s legal expertise; his or her professional experience; 
ability to perform the duties of a Judge; language skills; aptitude for working as part 
of a team in an international environment in which several legal systems are 
represented; finally, his or her impartiality and independence must of course be 
beyond doubt.’68 
 
In a broadly similar manner, the ICC Advisory Committee’s assessment is ‘based on the 
requirements of article 36, paragraphs 3 (a), (b) and (c), of the Rome Statute, which require 
‘established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the necessary relevant 
experience, whether as a judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, in criminal 
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proceedings’, ‘an excellent knowledge of and [fluency] in at least one of the working 
languages of the Court’ and capability to undertake full-time work for the full term. A 
combination of these requirements, with the necessary modifications to ensure knowledge of 
both public international and investment law, could be drawn up in the context of IPSIA. 
Additionally, it is essential that an explicit provision that IPSIA take into account gender 
balance and geographical representation be included in these criteria. 69 
 
Practice highlights the importance of in-person interviews for the functioning of such 
advisory bodies. For instance, the Advisory Committee of the ICC has decided that ‘[t]he 
Committee’s consistent experience has been that the interviews with candidates have 
revealed important elements relating to how they fulfil the requirements of article 36 of the 
Rome Statute and to the relevance of their professional experience to the work of the Court, 
which were not detected in the written submissions.’70 Similar interviews are carried out in 
the context of the Article 255 process,71 which inform deliberations (in private) before a 
reasoned recommendation is made to the Member State of the candidate in question. The 
positive or negative nature of this recommendation is kept confidential, again for fear of 
discouraging applicants or damaging the individual in question’s reputation.72 In contrast, the 
ICC Advisory Committee prepares ‘information and analysis, of a technical character, strictly 
on the suitability of the candidates’ which is then circulated to all States Parties and observers 
in sufficient time to allow for votes are cast at the Assembly of States Parties. The identities 
of the candidates and a short report on the Committee’s findings are also made publicly 
available in separate reports.73  
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In terms of timescale for this process, a 30-day turnaround could be a realistic target for 
IPSIA. Looking again to a relevant comparator, data shows that between 2010 and 2013 the 
average amount of time for a candidate to be considered by the Article 255 Panel of the EU 
was just 64 days, with 30% of cases being concluded in less than 45 days.74 And in fact, it has 
been suggested that one factor in slowing up this process was indolence on the part of 
Member States – something which one would imagine would not be an issue in the 
investment law context with two parties willing and actively participating in the process. 75 
 
But what standard of judicial independence is applicable in the context of international 
investment arbitration? Is it the same standard of judicial independence that applies to 
domestic courts or permanent international courts such as the International Court of Justice? 
The answer to this question is almost certainly no. In fact, the degree of judicial 
independence required by the rule of law in each context is inherently variable. 76 
Accordingly, whilst parties’ exclusive control over the appointments process may not be 
appropriate, complete renunciation of this prerogative is not necessary either. This most 
likely requires further elaboration. That under the current ISDS system arbitrators are 
appointed by parties to the dispute underlies the (understandable) general perception that 
party-appointed arbitrators are somehow less independent and impartial than judges 
appointed through some other process to permanent courts.77 The role of arbitrators in 
investment arbitration, however, is not the same as that of judges on a permanent court, and 
as such it should not be surprising that their appointment processes are also different.78 This 
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too likely means that judicial standards of independence and impartiality79 are not currently 
suited to the context of investment arbitration.  
 
The exact standard of independence against which candidates are scrutinised is not one which 
should be imposed from above by the drafters of IPSIA’s constitutive instrument, but rather 
should be one which is developed by IPSIA itself throughout the course of its operation, 
whether that be in the form of a general statement as to the operation of the tribunal as was 
the case with the Article 255 Panel,80  or through the reasoned decisions in individual cases 
over time.  
 
3.5 The Advisory Nature of the Panel’s Work 
 
One of the key elements of any proposal to introduce scrutiny of arbitral candidates by an 
independent body in accordance with rule of law considerations is of course whether that 
body’s findings would bind the parties. Given the complete control that parties have over 
appointments at this point in time, it is unlikely that they would agree to put themselves at the 
mercy of an independent body that could constrain their discretion to appoint their arbitrators 
through a binding decision. Indeed, analogous advisory bodies at both the international and 
domestic levels almost exclusively issue recommendations rather than binding decisions.81 
 
For example, the recommendation of the 255 Panel is just that, a recommendation without 
binding force, and the Council does not formally have to follow the recommendation of the 
255 Panel. In practice, however, this has not been how the system has operated. In fact, it has 
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even been said that in reality the 255 Panel ‘holds a de facto veto power.’82 This setup, 
whereby the independent body tasked with scrutinising candidates for judicial office is 
formally advisory but practically respected is replicated in a number of domestic legal 
systems. 83 
 
The 255 Panel has played an active role since its establishment. In the period between 2010 
and 2013 the Panel made unfavourable recommendations in relation to seven out of 67 
candidates that it examined. Although the process remains confidential, the Panel has 
indicated that reasons for the negative assessment of a candidate in practice have included a 
lack of relevant professional experience84 and lack of relevant legal knowledge.85 The fact 
that none of the candidates who had been given an unfavourable opinion by the 255 Panel 
ever went on to become a judge underlines the practical power that it possesses. 86  
 
Similarly, at the ICC scrutiny has been conducted of, and non-binding recommendations 
made regarding,87 a number of judges since its first meeting in 2013. At its second meeting, 
the first time that there had been judicial elections since its establishment, the Advisory 
Committee was tasked with assessing two candidates, one of whom was Leslie Van 
Rompaey, who had been put forward by Uruguay. After having examined the relevant 
documentation, and conducting an in-person interview with the candidate, the Committee 
raised concerns that the candidate had not himself conducted criminal proceedings, and 
questioned the candidate’s oral proficiency in English.88 Subsequently, the candidate was 
withdrawn by Uruguay before votes could be case. This was not an isolated incident, with the 
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Advisory Committee raising concerns as to judges’ abilities in subsequent years,89 and as 
with the Article 255 Panel, no judge ever given a negative recommendation by the Advisory 
Committee has ever gone on to become a judge at the ICC, either being withdrawn by their 
State or losing in the early rounds of elections. 
 
4 Interim Evaluation 
 
Of course, the crucial question is whether the introduction of IPSIA will in fact serve to 
address the current problematic aspects of the current system set out above. The introduction 
of IPSIA would be a step in the right direction in terms of addressing certain important 
issues. For instance, the specific guidance given to the parties to put forward candidates with 
geographical and gender considerations in mind could begin to resolve the current 
problematic issue of a lack of representativeness among decision-makers. Likewise, knowing 
that the individuals they put forward will have to account for their track record of previous 
appointments, affiliations, publications and stated views will act as an extra level of scrutiny 
informed by considerations of the international rule of law and inevitably open up the pool of 
individuals who ultimately become decision-makers.   
 
Such hopes are not merely utopian, in light of practice in other areas. Aside from the actual 
scrutiny of the application and the interview process itself, there are other positive aspects of 
setting out in clear terms the standards against which candidates will be judged. In contrast to 
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past practice, the fact that objective criteria are spelled out provides a degree level of 
transparency that should bring greater predictability to the process in the future, and parties 
should be clearer on what IPSIA will value and, it can be hoped, adjust their own thinking 
when selecting a candidate in the first place.90 For instance, one of the most interesting 
aspects of the introduction of the 255 Panel has been its knock-on effect on judicial selection 
processes at the domestic level. As Dumbrovsky, Petkova and Van Der Sluis have stated, 
since the introduction of the Panel, ‘many Member States have strengthened the procedural 
guarantees of screening candidates at the national level.’91 This form of top-down, knock-on 
effect on the practice of parties in their deliberations over who to put forward could also be a 
consequence of the institution of the IPSIA. 
 
Of course, one should not paint too rosy a picture of the potential creation of IPSIA. As 
pointed out above, several difficult procedural hurdles would need to be cleared before it 
became a reality. Even if some sort of consensus for reform of the current system of ISDS 
was found at the multilateral level, it is clear that convincing parties to relinquish their current 
level of control over appointments will be an uphill battle. And even if such agreement could 
be found, the absence of a centralised representative or executive body which could appoint 
members to oversee the operation of IPSIA presents a major challenge. This paper proposes a 
remedial solution, but it is in no way perfect. In this vein, we should note that IPSIA would 
be free from any democratic control, and as such its legitimacy could easily be called into 
question, especially if the manner in which it operated fell in any way short in terms of 
transparency or due process.92 
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The central contention of this paper is that the introduction of an IPSIA could address some 
of the current weaknesses in the current system of appointments in ISDS. As an aside, should 
support coalesce around proposals for the creation of a MIC, one could easily see how IPSIA, 
in the form proposed, could be adapted to provide the same independent scrutiny functions 
for the judicial appointees to such a body. However, regardless of the outcome of the current 
multilateral process under the auspices of UNCITRAL, it now seems certain that some form 
of independent scrutiny of appointments is an inevitability. As such, it is incumbent upon us 
to push for the most robust reforms possible, and to ensure that independence and impartiality 
in accordance with the international rule of law and representativeness of decision-makers is 
entrenched in these reforms.  
 
In doing so, transparency must be the guiding principle in order to ensure that IPSIAis seen 
as legitimate by parties, assuring them that it is not some ‘bloodthirsty secret judicial 
fraternit[y] that, following esoteric and arcane rituals…admits…new acolytes into the ranks 
of the transnational judicial priesthood.’93 If we are to ask parties to make concessions with 
regard to current monopoly on the appointment of arbitrators, it is essential that the 
transparency and ethics of the appointments process under that body must be exemplary, 
whilst also avoiding any suspicion of ‘cronyism and other forms of corruption’ which have 
mired the current system of ISDS.94 
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